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Résumé / Abstract
A l’aide de données sur la consommation des ménages et d’équations d’Euler, cet article estime le
taux d’aversion au risque relatif. Ces équations d’Euler sont les implications de structures de marché qui
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la prime de risque et l’énigme du taux sans risque. Lorsque l’on ignore les erreurs de mesure de la
consommation, les erreurs de l’équation d’Euler ne sont pas statistiquement différents de zéro pour les
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présence des erreurs de mesure, les estimations conservatrices du taux d’aversion au risque relatif pour les
participants à un marché d’actifs indiquent une valeur entre 2 et 8. Ces résultats suggèrent que le taux
d’aversion au risque pourrait être plus bas que ce qui est couramment perçu. Par conséquent,
l’imperfection des marchés pourrait servir à résoudre les énigmes d’évaluation d’actifs.
This paper estimates the rate of relative risk aversion using Euler equations based on household-
level consumption data. These Euler equations are implications of market structures that do not
necessarily allow agents to perfectly insure themselves. The paper focuses on tests of the unconditional
Euler equation. In representative-agent frameworks, this type of test leads to the most intuitively
convincing rejections of asset-pricing models, such as the equity premium puzzle and the riskfree rate
puzzle. When measurement error in consumption is ignored, Euler equation errors are not statistically
different from zero for values of the rate of relative risk aversion between 1 and 3. When allowing for the
presence of measurement error, conservative estimates of the rate of risk aversion for asset market
participants indicate a value between 2 and 8. These findings suggest that the rate of risk aversion may be
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resolution of asset pricing puzzles.
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1 Introduction
Asset pricing puzzles such as the equity premium puzzle and the riskfree rate puzzle illus-
trate the failure of the representative-agent consumption-based asset pricing models of Lucas
(1978) and Breeden (1979) to explain the data. The reason for the widespread interest in
these puzzles is probably that they summarize the failure of the model in a way that is
intuitively appealing, by referring to mean returns or the ¯rst two moments of returns (e.g.
see Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Hansen and Jagannathan (1991)). This failure of the
model is easier to grasp intuitively than a statistical rejection.
The focus of this paper is on the importance of incomplete markets structures, and
therefore on the measurement of the pricing kernel, for the interpretation of these asset
pricing puzzles. In the literature on incomplete markets, the focus has traditionally been on
asset-pricing puzzles and less on statistical tests of the model. Early papers (for instance
Telmer (1993) and Lucas (1994)) conclude, using a simulation framework, that the impact of
incomplete markets on the equity premium puzzle is minimal, because through self-insurance
agents end up with consumption allocations that are very similar to those in the complete
markets case. Later work by Heaton and Lucas (1996), Constantinides and Du±e (1996),
Telmer, Storesletten and Yaron (1997) and Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (1998)
points out that the impact of incomplete markets depends on a number of issues, such as the
persistence of idiosyncratic shocks, the relation of idiosyncratic shocks to aggregate shocks,
the net supply of bonds and the speci¯cation of market frictions. The consensus from this
literature, which is mostly based on simulation, seems to be that we do not yet have a model
that can explain the stylized facts on asset returns, but market incompleteness brings model
predictions more in line with the data and therefore holds promise to explain asset pricing
puzzles, possibly by incorporating additional rigidities or alternative utility functions.
In a closely related literature, papers by Jacobs (1999), Brav, Constantinides and Geczy
(1999), Cogley (1999) and Vissing-Jorgensen (1999) provide additional insight into incom-
plete markets structures by testing the incomplete markets framework using data on house-
hold consumption. While these tests are of great interest for asset pricing, their interpreta-
tion is sometimes problematic because of data limitations and because simple implications
of dynamic asset markets such as Euler equations can in principle be tested in many dif-
ferent ways. This paper contributes to this literature by investigating the importance of
these two potential problems (data limitations and the type of testing technique), which are
to some extent interrelated. First, consider the type of test. Jacobs (1999) uses a standard
econometric technique to conclude that certain implications of incomplete market models are
statistically rejected by the data. Whereas these statistical tests are instructive, they su®er
from the same problem as the Hansen and Singleton (1982) tests in the representative agent
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literature, because they are intuitively less appealing than the formulation of the model's
performance in terms of asset pricing puzzles. This paper attempts to provide additional
insight by using household consumption data to construct tests that can be more readily
related to the equity premium puzzle and the risk free rate puzzle.
Second, one of the critical problems with the interpretation of tests of Euler equations
that use household data is the impact of measurement error in consumption. One of the ways
in which such measurement error can be addressed is by loglinearizing the Euler equation,
as in Runkle (1991) and Vissing-Jorgensen (1999). This paper investigates a di®erent, more
direct approach to the measurement errror problem. Instead of using individual household
data to construct the tests, I use data for a consumer that is \representative" for a certain
group, such as an age group. For several plausible types of measurement error, this approach
will reduce the consequences of the presence of measurement error.
I ¯nd that it is important to take measurement error into account. However, even after
allowing for it, the data still indicate moderate degrees of risk aversion. This ¯nding
contrasts with ¯ndings in the representative agent literature. Studies of representative agent
models that exploit the unconditional Euler equation such as Mehra and Prescott (1985)
and Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) typically ¯nd very large values of the rate of relative
risk aversion. The paper therefore concludes that the incomplete markets framework holds
great promise to explain the equity premium puzzle and the riskfree rate puzzle. The paper
proceeds as follows. Section 2 brie°y discusses the evidence on asset pricing puzzles in
representative agent models. Section 3 discusses the existing evidence on incomplete markets,
outlines the testing methodology and discusses the strategy to deal with measurement error.
Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes by discussing the results and
outlining future research.
2 Asset Pricing Puzzles in Representative Agent Mod-
els
This paper investigates a set of joint restrictions on security returns and consumption. Con-
sider an agent with a time-separable constant relative risk aversion (TS-CRRA) utility func-
tion. If the agent maximizes lifetime utility, if she has a riskless and a risky asset at her
disposal, and if she does not end up at a corner solution, the following intertemporal Euler
equations will hold
1 = ¯Et
Ã
ci;t+1
ci;t
!°¡1
Rrl;t+1 (1)
1 = ¯Et
Ã
ci;t+1
ci;t
!°¡1
Rri;t+1 (2)
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where ci;t is the consumption of agent i in period t, Rrl;t+1 and Rri;t+1 are the riskless and
the risky return between periods t and t+1; ¯ is the discount factor, Et is the mathematical
expectation conditional on information available at t, and 1 ¡ ° is the rate of relative risk
aversion. The theory underlying (1) and (2), coupled with a complete markets assumption,
is the basis for much of modern asset pricing theory, and consequently there is substantial
interest in testing whether these intertemporal restrictions are supported by the data. If a
complete set of markets is available, then individual marginal utility is perfectly correlated
with the marginal utility of the representative agent, who consumes aggregate consumption,
and one can test the underlying theory by testing (1) and (2), with aggregate consumption
taking the place of individual household consumption.
The resulting literature on tests of the representative-agent consumption-based asset-
pricing model has shown that the model is at odds with the data in a number of dimen-
sions. The early literature (Hansen and Singleton (1982,1983), Grossman, Melino and Shiller
(1987)) mainly focuses on the statistical investigation of a number of restrictions implied by
the model, and concludes that the model is statistically rejected by the data. Starting with
Mehra and Prescott (1985), attention has shifted to well-de¯ned puzzles, aspects of the model
which are easily understood intuitively and are clearly at odds with the data. Even though
a considerable research e®ort has unearthed a large number of these puzzles, the ones that
are most often cited are the equity premium puzzle and the riskfree rate puzzle. The equity
premium puzzle, originally pointed out by Mehra and Prescott (1985), states that to explain
the di®erence in the return of the risky and the riskless asset, we need risk aversion of the
representative agent to be higher than 10, a number which Mehra and Prescott believe to be
implausibly high. The riskfree rate puzzle, ¯rst pointed out by Weil (1989), observes that if
risk aversion is that high, the discount factor ¯ required to match the historically observed
riskfree rate is larger than one.
It must be noted that the equity premium puzzle and the riskfree rate puzzle are not
entirely without controversy. To understand this, note that as Kocherlakota (1996) points
out, these puzzles are quantitative but not qualitative puzzles. The comovements between
the variables of interest in the data conform to the theory, but to match the magnitudes
observed in the data, the unobservable parameters of interest ¯ and 1 ¡ ° have to assume
values that are considered implausible. A potential reaction to the puzzles is therefore that
judging behavioral parameters as implausible, presumably based on introspection, is not very
convincing. In this context, note that Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) argue that fairly high
levels of risk aversion may not be implausible, while Kocherlakota (1990) has demonstrated
that values of ¯ larger than one can be supported in equilibrium. Whereas this argument is
interesting, this paper takes it as given that a large number of economists regard the values
of the behavioral parameters as implausible.
These intuitively appealing summaries of the failure of the model have given rise to a very
extensive literature. A large part of this literature has focused on changes to the TS-CRRA
utility speci¯cation that is used in Mehra and Prescott (1985). As pointed out in a number
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of studies (e.g. see Hansen and Jagannathan (1991)), the ¯nding that risk aversion has to
be high can be attributed to the fact that the marginal utility of the representative agent
is not volatile enough. Consequently, a solution to the puzzle is to make marginal utility
more volatile by changing the utility function. Kocherlakota (1996) argues that proposed
utility speci¯cations such as habit formation (see Abel (1990), Campbell and Cochrane
(1999), Constantinides (1990), Detemple and Zapatero (1991), Ferson and Constantinides
(1991), Heaton (1995) and Sundaresan (1989)) and nonexpected utility (see Epstein and
Zin (1989,1991) and Weil (1990)) are able to explain the risk free rate puzzle but not the
equity premium puzzle. This paper does not discuss empirical evidence on these alternative
preference structures, not because they do not have merit, but because the issue of interest
is best illustrated using the popular TS-CRRA speci¯cation.
3 Household Consumption Data and Asset Pricing Puz-
zles
3.1 Empirical Methodology
It has long been recognized that incomplete markets structures are a potential explanation
of the equity premium puzzle (e.g. see Mankiw (1986) and Mehra and Prescott (1985)).
However, the analysis of incomplete markets structures has been conducted using di®erent
empirical methodologies. First, a number of studies use simulation techniques. Whereas
early quantitative evidence (Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), Huggett (1993), Telmer (1993) and
Lucas (1994)) indicates that incomplete markets cannot resolve asset pricing puzzles, it is
now recognized that the occurrence of uninsurable risk in a model economy brings predicted
asset returns more in line with the data. For instance, Telmer, Storesletten, and Yaron
(1997) and Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (1999) achieve some degree of success in
matching the data using an overlapping-generations framework.
However, the predictions of model economies with incomplete markets depend critically
on a number of issues that have to be measured prior to setting up the model to explain asset
returns. For instance, the precise measurement of transaction costs is an important issue
(see Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), Constantinides (1986), He and Modest (1995), Heaton
and Lucas (1995,1996) and Luttmer (1996)). Another important issue is the persistence
of idiosyncratic shocks to income (e.g. see Constantinides and Du±e (1996) and Heaton
and Lucas (1995, 1996)).1 It must be noted that any future resolution of issues such as
1See also the discussion in Kocherlakota (1996). The issue of persistence is important because it deter-
mines the extent to which an individual can insure against income shocks. Given su±cient potential for
self-insurance, the outcome of an incomplete markets economy will be similar to that of a complete markets
economy (Telmer (1993)). It must be noted that a model economy with high shock persistence has implica-
tions similar to a model economy where the number of shocks is small in comparison to the individual's life
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the persistence of income shocks requires a careful analysis of household-level data, and
therefore simulation-based studies are subject to similar criticism about data limitations as
direct statistical analyses of household-level data.
A second approach to analyzing market incompleteness focuses on restrictions implied
by the model under a weaker set of assumptions, such as restrictions (1) and (2). This is the
approach followed in this paper. Besides providing a valuable complement to simulation-
based studies, parameter estimates obtained through this analysis are also of interest as
inputs in simulations or calibrations. To motivate the empirical analysis in this paper and
to see the link with existing studies, consider the following framework. Consider the errors
u1i;t and u2i;t associated with the Euler equations (1) and (2), where t is the time index and
i is the household index. Theory speci¯es Et¡1u1i;t = Et¡1u2i;t = 0: The equity premium
puzzle and the riskfree rate puzzle can then be understood using the expressions E u1i;t = E
u2i;t = 0; which are readily obtained using the law of iterated expectations: First consider the
corresponding restrictions in the representative-agent case. In this case E u1t = E u2t = 0:
There is no i subscript: the theory speci¯es only two orthogonality conditions. Therefore, in
the representative-agent case, we have a just identi¯ed econometric problem: two equations
in the two unknowns ¯ and 1 ¡ °.
The incomplete markets case we analyze in this paper can be cast in a similar setup. In
this case we have a maximum of T observations on N households. In contrast to the rep-
resentative agent problem, the optimization problem using household data is overidenti¯ed:
we have 2 £N restrictions to determine 2 parameters. However, these 2 £N orthogonality
restrictions can conveniently be reduced to 2 orthogonality conditions in an intuitively ap-
pealing way. Noting that the panel is unbalanced, denote the number of households in the
sample at time t as Nt. We can simply use the two orthogonality conditions E u1t and E u2t
where ujt = (1=Nt)
PNt
i=1 u
j
i;t, which gives us two equations in two unknowns.
It is possible to provide more intuition by further relating this setup to the existing
literature using a generalized method of moments (GMM) framework. See Campbell, Lo
and MacKinlay (1997), Cochrane (2001) and Ferson (1995) for a more in-depth treatment.
In the representative agent case one can think of the errors u1t and u2t associated with the
Euler equations as pricing errors. In the incomplete markets case u1t and u2t are average
pricing errors. The type of analysis that is directly based on the pricing errors is often
referred to as the analysis of the unconditional Euler equation. Now consider the same
sample with a maximum of T observations on N households and consider an instrument
zi;t¡1 (notice that for simplicity the instrument does not carry a superscript, to indicate that
we can use the same instrument for both equations). Then consider "1i;t = u1i;tzi;t¡1 and
"2i;t = u2i;tzi;t¡1: Using the law of iterated expectations we know that E "1i;t = E "2i;t = 0,
for all i. We therefore again have 2 £N orthogonality conditions, which can be reduced to
span. This partly explains the success of the overlapping generations models in Telmer, Storesletten, and
Yaron (1997) and Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (1999).
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two orthogonality conditions E "1t and E "2t where "
j
t = (1=Nt)
PNt
i=1 "
j
i;t: If the instrument
zi;t¡1 depends on time (such as asset returns or consumption growth), the resulting analysis
is referred to as exploiting the conditional Euler equation. Another way this is referred to
in the literature is as an analysis of \scaled" pricing errors or as a payo® to a \managed
portfolio" (Cochrane (2001)). In contrast, the analysis of the unconditional Euler equation
described above analyzes the \unscaled" pricing errors. Another way to interpret this is as
an analysis of scaled pricing errors where the \scaling" instrument zi;t¡1 is a constant.
The GMM framework looks at two theoretical restrictions such as E u1t = E u2t = 0 or
E "1t = E "2t = 0 as two orthogonality conditions, regardless of whether they originate from
representative agent problems or incomplete markets problems and regardless of whether the
instrument zi;t¡1 is time-varying. The GMM approach exploits the fact that if the theory
can explain the data, the sample equivalent of these orthogonality conditions should be zero.
At its most general, consider the restrictions implied by an incomplete markets economy
with a time-varying instrument zi;t¡1. De¯ne the 2£ 1 vector "t = ("1t ; "2t )0 and consider the
minimization problem
JT = [
1
T
TX
t=1
"t(Á)0] W [
1
T
TX
t=1
"t(Á)]: (3)
where Á denotes the (2 £ 1) parameter vector and W is a weighting matrix. The equity
premium puzzle can be cast in this statistical framework by observing that the corresponding
minimization problem (3), when using aggregate data and when using a constant as an
instrument, yields large levels of risk aversion and a value of ¯ larger than one. The question
addressed by this paper asks if the corresponding minimization problem using household
data yields more plausible parameter values. It must be noted that to obtain consistent
estimates of the parameters ¯ and 1 ¡ °, one can actually analyze "t = ("1t ; "2t )0 instead
of minimizing (3), because the problem is just identi¯ed. Therefore, to ¯nd the parameter
values, we can solve "t = ("1t ; "2t )0 using a nonlinear solution algorithm, and we do not
necessarily have to analyze (3). A valid solution to the optimization problem (3) is one for
which "t = ("1t ; "2t )0 is exactly zero.2 However, for analyses of the conditional Euler equation
that use more instruments zi;t¡1, this is not the case. For instance, if we consider the Euler
equations (1) and (2) and use two lagged instruments for each Euler equation, we end up
with four orthogonality conditions to determine the two parameters. The problem is then
overidenti¯ed and can only be analyzed by minimizing (3). In this case the choice of the
weighting matrixW is critical, while it is of no consequence for a just-identi¯ed problem. See
Hansen and Singleton (1982) and Jacobs (1999) for econometric analyses of overidenti¯ed
problems in the representative agent and incomplete markets cases respectively.
2This statement of course has to be understood to mean that the Euler equation errors are arbitrarily
close to zero. The same is true for the objective function in (3).
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3.2 Interpreting Asset Pricing Puzzles
A few more observations about the interpretation of the equity premium puzzle and the risk-
free rate puzzle are in order which are most conveniently illustrated using a GMM framework.
First, in the case of the equity premium puzzle, since we are dealing with a just identi¯ed
GMM problem it is clear that we cannot test the theory in a formal econometric sense. We
have just enough orthogonality conditions available to estimate parameters and compute
standard errors. It is therefore clear that in the context of this GMM optimization problem
the equity premium puzzle has to be seen as a statement about the plausibility of estimated
parameters. Second, when considering the risk free rate puzzle from the perspective of some
well-de¯ned GMM problem, since we have one equation with two parameters, the problem
is underidenti¯ed. So not only can we not test the theory econometrically, in principle we
cannot obtain estimates of the behavioral parameters either. The caveat, clearly expressed
in the literature, is of course that when discussed in this context, the risk free rate puzzle is
a puzzle conditional on the existence of the equity premium puzzle (e.g. see Campbell, Lo
and MacKinlay (1997), Kocherlakota (1996)). Conditional on large risk aversion, the Euler
equation associated with the riskless asset implies an implausible discount rate. So in the
context of the GMM problem above, once we have an estimate of 1¡°, we have one equation
in one remaining unknown, a just identi¯ed problem.
However, the asset-pricing literature also contains a number of techniques and analyses
which provide a slightly di®erent formulation of asset-pricing puzzles. In the GMM setup
described above, the Euler equations for the riskless and the risky asset yield two Euler equa-
tions in the representative agent context. The reason why we are not able to test the model
statistically is that we choose to use these two orthogonality conditions to obtain inference
on the two parameters. Alternatively, conditional on knowledge of the parameter values,
we have two overidentifying conditions available to test the model. Even the risk-free rate
puzzle becomes testable econometrically, since it becomes a problem with one overidentifying
condition. Therefore, we can construct tests of these asset pricing models conditional on a
wide range of parameter values. Asset pricing puzzles are then slightly restated but intu-
itively similar: instead of using the data to infer parameter values, and then judge whether
these parameter values are plausible, we construct econometric tests of Euler equation errors
conditional on a range of parameter values, and then ask ourselves if those parameter values
that imply Euler errors that are statistically indistinguishable from zero are plausible. The
simplest possible implementation of this methodology is illustrated in Kocherlakota (1996).
Whereas that paper constructs univariate t-tests, in principle multivariate chi-square tests
can be constructed. Indeed, to use multivariate information in an optimal way, GMM-type
testing conditional on the behavioral parameters can be used (see Burnside (1994), Cecchetti,
Lam and Mark (1994) and Hansen, Heaton and Luttmer (1995)). To some extent, this can
be interpreted as an application of incorporating prior information, with the prior either
resulting from introspection, or from other (related) information. Although they have a dif-
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ferent focus than the analysis in Kocherlakota (1996), the techniques advocated by Hansen
and Jagannathan (1991) use a similar setup. These graphical techniques focus on values
of behavioral parameters needed to match the ¯rst and second moments of asset returns.
For instance, using only the riskfree asset we ¯nd that for a \plausible" value of ¯ of 0:95;
\implausible" levels of risk aversion are needed to match the riskfree rate. This paper follows
a similar approach to analyze the incomplete markets case using panel data. The tests are
based on overidenti¯ed GMM problems such as (3), which lead to tests of the models using
Â2 statistics.
3.3 Measurement error
The estimation and analysis of (1) and (2) using data on individual household consumption
assumes that the available data are measured without error. We know that for panel data
this is unlikely to be the case (see Altonji (1986) and Altonji and Siow (1987)). While it is
by de¯nition impossible to remove this measurement error from the data, there are a number
of alternatives available to reduce its consequences. One potential solution is to loglinearize
the Euler equations, as in Runkle (1991) and Vissing-Jorgensen (1999). Such a loglineariza-
tion can be justi¯ed by relying on a Taylor series approximation or by assuming that the
distribution of the data is jointly lognormal, and it can resolve measurement error problems
given appropriate instrumentation. While this is an interesting approach, the disadvantage
is that if the assumptions underlying the loglinearization are incorrect, the resulting test
statistics and parameter estimates will be biased. Another potential technique to assess the
implications of measurement error is to assume a functional form for the measurement error
and to use simulation techniques to investigate its impact on the test statistics. This ap-
proach is followed by Vissing-Jorgensen (1999) and Brav, Constantinides and Geczy (1999).
While this is an interesting approach, its validity is predicated on assuming the correct type
of measurement error.
In this paper I propose to use synthetic cohorts to reduce the negative impact of measure-
ment error. Synthetic cohorts have been used in the economics literature for a long time.3
The approach requires the construction of cohorts, groups of individuals with comparable
characteristics. For instance, one often used approach is to form cohorts based on age. For
each age group, we construct a \representative" individual who has data associated with
him/her that are the average of the data in that age group. It is clear that this is also an
imperfect solution to the measurement error problem. If the consumption growth of one
of the individuals in a certain age group is measured with error, the measurement error is
not eliminated. Instead, the relative importance of the measurement error is reduced by
averaging it out using other observations. Moreover, it must be noted that the formation of
3The traditional motivation for using the synthetic cohorts technique is somewhat di®erent. It has mainly
been used because many available panels are too short for the analysis of rational expectations models (see
Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985) and Attanasio and Weber (1995)).
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synthetic cohorts can also adversely a®ect the analysis. The central thesis of the market
incompleteness literature is that the study of representative agent data is to some extent
uninformative because variability in individual marginal rates of substitution is averaged
out when studying the marginal rate of substitution of the representative consumer. When
constructing synthetic cohorts, one runs into the same problem that besides averaging out
the e®ects of measurement error, one also averages out genuine volatility in marginal rates
of subsitution. In fact, the construction of a representative agent can be seen as the extreme
of synthetic cohorts construction, with just one cohort. As a result, one partially reduces
the consequences of measurement error, but at the cost of introducing a new problem. The
synthetic cohort approach can therefore be interpreted as ¯nding a middle way between
the problems associated with using individual data (measurement error) and the problems
associated with the representative agent approach (eliminating MRS variability).
In the empirical work, I use synthetic cohorts based on relatively large groups, which
presumably eliminate most of the measurement error. Because such a construction also
eliminates some genuine MRS variability, the resulting parameter estimates can usefully be
interpreted as conservative estimates of the rate of risk aversion. I ¯rst construct synthetic
cohorts by sorting on the age of the household head. I use households where the household
head is aged between 25 and 60; resulting in 36 cohorts. I provide a robustness check by also
constructing synthetic cohorts using the household head's education as well as his age, using
12 age categories and 2 educational categories. This results in 24 cohorts. In principle, it is
possible to conduct further robustness checks by using interesting variables such as household
wealth and household income as sorting variables. The analysis in this paper is limited to
the two sorts described above to keep the presentation of the evidence manageable.
There is one remaining issue regarding the cohort construction. The main variable of
interest in this study is consumption growth. For each cohort group, we therefore con-
struct an average consumption growth variable. However, this can be done in (at least)
two di®erent ways. First one can construct the cohort consumption level and then use
the cohort consumption level to compute cohort consumption growth. More precisely, given
individual consumption ci;t the consumption of a representative cohort j at time t is given
by ccoj;t = (1=Nj;t)
PNj;t
i=1 ci;t, where Nj;t is the number of observations in this cohort at
time t. Consumption growth for the cohort is then computed as ccog1;j;t = (ccoj;t=ccoj;t¡1)
Alternatively, one can compute cohort consumption growth by averaging over individual
consumption growth of the cohort members. More precisely, ccog2;j;t = (1=Nj;t)
PNj;t
i=1 (cgi;t)
where cgi;t = ci;t=ci;t¡1:
3.4 Related Literature
Besides the literature on incomplete markets referred to in section 3.1, there are a number
of studies that are related to the empirical work in this paper. First, the complete markets
assumption has been strongly statistically rejected in a number of recent studies (see Attana-
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sio and Davis (1997), Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), Hayashi, Altonji and Kotliko® (1996);
see Altug and Miller (1990) and Miller and Sieg (1997) for con°icting evidence). Second,
Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) investigate the impact of asset market participation on the equity
premium puzzle. They are motivated by aggregation results that hold only for asset market
participants (see Grossman and Shiller (1982)). Therefore, they use panel data to eliminate
non-assetholders from the sample and investigate if the resulting per capita consumption
of assetholders di®ers from per capita consumption for all households. Mankiw and Zeldes
(1991) also obtain inference on parameters by analyzing the unconditional Euler equation.
However, because of their setup, they obtain inference on the rate of risk aversion but not
on the discount rate ¯. Also, the analysis focuses on per capita (average) consumption and
not on the properties of individual household consumption; however, the properties of per
capita consumption are dramatically di®erent from the properties of household consumption
or cohort consumption, suggesting that the assumptions necessary for aggregation of those
households at interior conditions are not validated by the data. While the use of per capita
consumption based on panel data presumably avoids most of the measurement error prob-
lems associated with individual consumption, it seems desirable to investigate the dispersion
in marginal rates of substitution in the cross-section.
Third, by focusing on individual household consumption, some of the results in this pa-
per are also intimately related to certain ¯ndings in the life-cycle literature, for instance
in the papers by Attanasio and Browning (1995), Attanasio and Weber (1993,1995), Hall
and Mishkin (1982), Runkle (1991) and Zeldes (1989). These papers typically investigate
linearizations of the conditional Euler equation associated with the riskless asset. Altug and
Miller (1990) use panel data to investigate nonlinear Euler equations under the maintained
hypothesis of market completeness. Finally, Jacobs (1999) investigates Euler equations (1)
and (2) without making a market completeness assumption. That study focuses on overi-
denti¯ed estimation problems which allow statistical tests of the model. The overidentifying
conditions are obtained from the conditional Euler equation. Jacobs (1999) ¯nds that the
consumption-based asset pricing model is statistically rejected by the data along several di-
mensions. Estimates of behavioral parameters are robust across estimation exercises, with
fairly plausible inference on the discount rate as well as the rate of relative risk aversion.
Whereas the results in the life-cycle literature and in Jacobs (1999) are insightful, more
evidence on asset pricing puzzles is desirable by focusing exclusively on the unconditional
Euler equation. To motivate this, a reference to the empirical evidence in the representative
agent literature is instructive. The results in Jacobs (1999) are obtained using panel data
and an incomplete markets assumption using similar information as exploited by Hansen and
Singleton (1982) in a representative agent framework. Hansen and Singleton (1982,1984)
reject the model statistically and obtain estimates of the rate of relative risk aversion that
are in most cases intuitively plausible.4 Estimates of the discount rate are very precise and
4However, some of the estimates of the rate of relative risk aversion in Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1984)
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in most cases intuitively plausible. However, the work of Hansen and Singleton (1983),
Mehra and Prescott (1985), Grossman, Melino and Shiller (1987) shows that if only the
unconditional Euler equation is used in the representative agent framework, inference on the
rate of relative risk aversion changes dramatically. Indeed, by using the unconditional Euler
equation one obtains the equity premium puzzle and the implied risk aversion is very high.
This ¯nding is con¯rmed using the tools developed by Hansen and Jagannathan (1991). So
obviously the type of information used is critical in representative agent studies, and this
could very well be the case when using household level data. The focus of this paper is
therefore to verify if the intuitively plausible estimates of the rate of relative risk aversion
obtained in Jacobs (1999) are con¯rmed when only unconditional information is used and
when measurement error is taken into account. As explained above, this is of substantial
interest because implicitly or explicitly, the validity of asset pricing theories has been judged
by these parameter values. It must be noted that the studies by Brav, Constantinides
and Geczy (1999), Cogley (1999) and Vissing-Jorgensen (1999) give partial answers to some
of these questions. These studies seem to indicate that measurement error has potentially
serious implications and that risk aversion is lower than in representative agent studies,
although the estimates di®er considerably between papers.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Data
The data used in the analysis are consumption data from the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID) that are also used in Jacobs (1999). I refer the reader to Jacobs (1999) for
a detailed discussion of the data; here I provide a brief summary. The data are taken from
the 1987 PSID ¯les and allow construction of consumption growth rates for the period 1974-
1985. The empirical analysis is repeated for four di®erent samples. The ¯rst sample consists
of all households who ful¯ll a set of sample selection criteria. This dataset contains 3555
households and 18813 total observations (note that the panel is unbalanced: a household can
be in the sample one year and not in another year). This sample is referred to as sample 1,
but a problem with this sample is that some of the households do not hold assets. Including
such households in the sample is likely to bias the results. I therefore use three smaller sam-
ples that contain only assetholders. A second sample (referred to as sample 2) includes only
households that report nonzero holdings of the riskless and the risky asset. It contains 740
households and 5029 total observations. A third and fourth sample (referred to as samples
3 and 4) contain only households that report holdings of the riskless and risky assets larger
than $1,000 and $10,000, respectively. These datasets contain 413 and 103 households and
are in the nonconcave region of the parameter space and the estimates are imprecise for several estimation
exercises.
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2990 and 769 total observations, respectively. Table I provides descriptive statistics for these
samples (in panel A) as well as for the samples synthetic cohorts based on them (in panels
B and C).5 Table IA indicates that sample 1 (the one containing all households) contains
more extreme outliers compared to the other samples. However, this may be partly due to
the fact that it is the largest sample. Another observation is that the cohort construction
signi¯cantly alters the properties of the di®erent datasets, as can be seen from a comparison
of table IA with tables IB and IC.
4.2 Asset Pricing Puzzles Under Incomplete Markets
We obtain inference on the equity premium in incomplete markets for the four samples
described above by analyzing ut = (u1t ; u2t )0, which is a system of two equations in two
unknowns, for each of these samples. Intuititively this analysis indicates whether we can
¯nd values of the parameters ¯ and 1 ¡ ° that can explain the average (across households)
Euler equation pricing errors for the riskless and the risky asset. However, there is an
additional empirical problem with household level consumption data in this context which
has not yet been discussed. Whereas the Euler equations (1) and (2) are de¯ned for an
individual agent, consumption data are available at the household level. In principle this
issue is easily addressed by including a function of household size in the Euler equation. We
can estimate
1 = ¯Et
Ã
ci;t+1
ci;t
!°¡1
Rrl;t+1 exp(f1fsi;t+1 + f2fsi;t) (4)
1 = ¯Et
Ã
ci;t+1
ci;t
!°¡1
Rri;t+1 exp(f1fsi;t+1 + f2fsi;t) (5)
where fsi;t stands for family size in period t and f1 and f2 are scalar parameters. However,
this means four parameters to estimate and the Euler equations for the riskless and the
risky asset give us only two orthogonality conditions, when using a constant as the sole
instrument. The problem is underidenti¯ed. We can solve this problem in two ways. First,
we can include current and lagged household size in the instrument set, to yield four equations
in four unknowns. The approach I follow instead is to plug in estimates of f1 and f2 that are
obtained from the estimation of overidenti¯ed or just identi¯ed estimation problems implied
by (4) and (5). This results in a just-identi¯ed problem of two equations in two unknowns.
It was veri¯ed that estimates of f1 and f2 are robust across estimation exercises, and do not
in°uence the empirical results.
Results on the equity premium puzzle are presented using a graphical tool that is in the
same spirit as the tables in Kocherlakota (1996). Instead of conducting an econometric
5Panels B and C indicate that some cohorts do not contain observations in some cases.
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analysis and evaluating the parameters using the results of econometric estimation, we eval-
uate the orthogonality restrictions for a number of combinations of the parameter values,
and subsequently ask if any of the parameter values for which the theory is not rejected is
intuitively plausible. To facilitate the interpretation of the results on incomplete markets
obtained with this alternative technique, ¯gure 1 analyzes the Euler equation errors for the
more familiar representative agent case, using the Mehra and Prescott (1985) annual data
for 1889-1979. Figure 1C summarizes the information in the sample equivalents to the Euler
equations in the way it is going to be used in the rest of the paper. This ¯gure summarizes
the information contained in ¯gures 1A and 1B. To save space the counterparts to ¯gures
1A and 1B are omitted in the ¯gures that analyze household data.
Figure 1A presents a grid where the inputs are the discount rate and the rate of relative
risk aversion. For the discount rate ¯ values between 0.5 and 1.1 are analyzed. For ° ¡ 1
(the negative of the rate of relative risk aversion) we limit our attention to values between
-50 (in the concave region of the parameter space) and +20 (in the nonconcave region of
the parameter space). The vertical axis represents the negative of the absolute value of the
average Euler equation error for the riskless asset. Therefore, this grid reaches a maximum
value of zero for parameter combinations that solve the Euler equation for the riskless asset.
We can therefore conduct the following informal exercise: pick an a priori reasonable value
of ¯ and verify what level of risk aversion is necessary to solve the Euler equation. Many
economists would argue that values of beta between 0.8 and 1 are intuitively plausible. Given
these values and the data, a solution to the Euler equation is given for relative risk aversion
of approximately 25 to 35, which many economists consider implausibly high. Figure 1B
presents the same analysis for the Euler equation associated with the risky asset. Again,
given plausible discount rates we need very high rates of risk aversion to solve the Euler
equation. Note that for a given plausible discount rate, the risk aversion needed to match
the riskless rate is slightly lower than the one needed to match the risky rate.
Figure 1C presents the information contained in ¯gures 1A and 1B in a more parsimonious
way. This ¯gure has the discount rate on the horizontal axis and risk aversion on the vertical
axis. The triangles and squares present combinations of the parameters that make the Euler
equations for the risky and the riskless asset respectively equal to zero.6 For all values of
¯ smaller than one, the squares are above the circles. In other words, it is not possible to
¯nd a parameter combination that solves both Euler equations as long as the discount rate
6Because ¯gures 1A and 1B are in fact created using a grid, the \ridge" in these ¯gures that suggests
zero Euler equation errors is in fact a locus of very small Euler equation errors. It was veri¯ed that actual
solutions to the equations exist in the neighbourhood of the parameter values in the grid. Presenting a
¯ner grid does not provide any additional insight. With respect to ¯gure 1C, note that the \solutions"
pulled of the grid are therefore \near" solutions. This ¯gure could be made more precise by presenting a
locus of exact solutions, but again this does not provide any additional insight. After all, whether a relative
risk aversion of 30.32 or 30.36 is needed to match the restrictions of the model is not likely to in°uence our
assessment of the model's performance.
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is smaller than one. When ¯ is allowed to be larger than one, a solution to the system of
equations can be found, namely for a discount rate approximately equal to 1.08 and a rate of
relative risk aversion approximately equal to 23. As extensively discussed above, these values
are judged to be implausible. What is perhaps not clearly indicated in the representative
agent literature is the fact that, for values of the discount rate only slightly higher than 1.08,
it is impossible to ¯nd a rate of risk aversion that solves the Euler equations for the risky
and riskless asset separately (let alone jointly).7
We now turn to similar graphical analyses of the restrictions imposed by the incomplete
markets models on the data for individual households. Figure 2 presents information for
the four individual household samples similar to that in ¯gure 1C. Figure 2A reports on
the sample of households that report nonzero holdings of the riskless and risky assets, and
¯gures 2B and 2C report on those households with holdings of the riskless and risky asset in
excess of $1,000 and $10,000 respectively. Finally, ¯gure 2D presents results for the complete
sample of 18813 observations.8
Figure 2 clearly indicates that parameter combinations needed to solve each Euler equa-
tion separately are much more plausible than in the representative agent model. Most
importantly, compared to the representative agent model, the data point towards lower risk
aversion. For most plausible values of the discount rate, the rate of relative risk aversion
implied by the data is between 0.5 and 3. With respect to discount rates, whereas in the
representative agent case solutions to separate Euler equations do not exist for discount rates
larger than 1.1, for the household level data we cannot obtain solutions to the Euler equation
for the risky asset for ¯ larger than 0.9, and to the Euler equations for the riskless asset for
7In a sense, the representation of asset pricing puzzles in ¯gure 1C is superior to simply reporting the
results of an econometric estimation exercise. The ¯gure has an advantage similar to an often used repre-
sentation of the Hansen-Jagannathan (1991) bounds, because in essence the test information is repeated for
many di®erent parameter combinations, and not exclusively for the parameter combination that minimizes a
given objective function. In some sense, the information in ¯gure 1C is also superior to Hansen-Jagannathan
(1991) bounds, because those bounds only use the ¯rst two moments of the IMRS. However, all these per-
ceived advantages over other testing methods have to be put in perspective. The representation of asset
pricing puzzles in ¯gure 1C is convenient because in the case of a CRRA speci¯cation we are dealing with a
two-parameter problem. Tools such as the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds and GMM estimation are designed
to deal with richer parameterizations of the utility function (see Heaton (1995) and Cochrane and Hansen
(1992)). Therefore, whereas the graphical tool used in ¯gure 1C may be useful in the context of this paper,
it is of limited use more generally.
8To provide some additional insight into the properties of the four samples, table II provides descriptive
statistics on a year-by year basis. This complements the descriptive statistics in table IA, which are for the
entire sample. Table II indicates that there is quite a bit of variation in the risky rate of return over the
sample period. When comparing the four di®erent samples, average consumption growth rates on a year-
by-year basis are fairly similar. The minima and maxima for consumption growth are more extreme for the
sample that contains all households, but it has to be kept in mind that this sample is larger, and therefore
more likely to contain extremely high and low growth rates of consumption. In terms of measurement
error, it must be noted that there seem to be very few extreme outliers, even though no consumption growth
criterion was used to screen observations.
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¯ larger than 0.95.
It is somewhat surprising that for the sample that includes non-assetholders (¯gure 2D)
implied risk aversion is not much di®erent from ¯gures 2A, 2B and 2C. Studies by Constan-
tinides, Brav and Geczy (1999), Vissing-Jorgensen (1999), and Mankiw and Zeldes (1991)
suggest that the distinction between assetholders and non-assetholders is important. The
evidence presented in ¯gure 2 suggests that the issue of aggregation is much more important
than the inclusion of non-assetholders in the sample. If the presence of non-assetholders in
the sample is an important issue, we would expect to see an implied rate of risk aversion
in ¯gure 2D that is more similar to the ones implied by representative agent models, and
therefore much higher than the ones in ¯gures 2A, 2B and 2C.
There is another important stylized fact in ¯gure 2 which requires elaboration. While
there is a large number of intuitively plausible combinations of ¯ and 1 ¡ ° for which each
of the Euler equations can be solved, there is no combination of ¯ and 1 ¡ ° that solves
both Euler equations simultaneously. In the ¯gures, such a parameter combination would
be represented by an intersection of the lines formed by the triangles and the squares. For
instance, in the representative agent case in ¯gure 1C there is such a case, but only for an
implausible parameter combination with ¯ larger than 1 and a large value for the rate of
relative risk aversion.9
What does this ¯nding mean? Asset pricing puzzles in the representative agent model are
often summarized by the ¯nding in ¯gure 1C that is summarized above: a \calibration" of
the model using both Euler equations yields an exact solution to the system of equations for
a discount rate approximately equal to 1.08 and a rate of relative risk aversion approximately
equal to 23. Of course, the puzzle is much deeper. Figure 1 clearly indicates that for almost
all reasonable discount rates, the rate of risk aversion implied by either Euler equation is
very large. The relevant question is not whether the particular values \calibrated" on the
system of two equations in two unknowns are plausible, but whether there are any parameter
combinations for which both Euler equation errors are statistically indistinguishable from
zero. This is the approach followed in most of the literature (see for instance Kocherlakota
(1996) and also (in a di®erent context) Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) and Cochrane and
Hansen (1992)). We therefore turn to a similar analysis for incomplete markets involving
the PSID household-level data.
9As mentioned above, ¯gure 2 represents systems of two equations in two unknowns. In principle therefore,
to ¯nd the parameter values implied by the data, we can solve "t = ("1t ; "2t )0 using a nonlinear solution
algorithm. Alternatively, we can analyze (3) which should have a minimum of zero if there is an exact
solution. Figure 2 indicates that whereas (3) has a minimum, at this minimum "t = ("1t ; "2t )0 is not zero.
This ¯nding is corroborated by an extensive grid search and a search using a nonlinear solution algorithm,
which indicates that there are no exact solutions.
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4.3 Statistically signi¯cant Euler equation errors
Figure 3 extends the graphical representation of the Euler equation errors in ¯gure 2 to illus-
trate all parameter combinations for which the Euler equations are not statistically di®erent
from zero. Figure 3A presents results for sample 2, ¯gure 3B for sample 3, ¯gure 3C for
sample 4, and ¯gure 3D for sample 1. Each ¯gure contains two solid lines and two broken
lines. The area between the two solid lines is the area for which the Euler equation for the
riskless asset is statistically indistinguishable from zero.10 The area between the broken lines
indicates the area for which the Euler equation for the risky asset is statistically indistin-
guishable from zero. Therefore, any overlap between these two areas can be interpreted as
a set of parameter combinations for which the equity premium is resolved.11
Each of the ¯gures contains such an overlap between the statistically signi¯cant solution
for the riskless asset and the risky asset. In all samples, the number of parameter combina-
tions that solves the Euler equation is much larger for the risky asset. As expected, the areas
that solve the Euler equations are largest in ¯gure 3C, the ¯gure for the smallest sample,
because this sample contains the smallest amount of information.12 Once again it is the case
that ¯gure 3D, which also includes non-assetholders, looks very similar to ¯gures 3A, 3B and
3C.
For the sake of comparison, ¯gure 1D provides a similar analysis for the representative
agent framework, using the Mehra-Prescott (1985) data. Note that this ¯gure contains only
1 solid line and 1 broken line. For a given discount rate, if the null hypothesis of a zero
Euler equation error cannot be rejected for a certain rate of relative risk aversion, it can also
not be rejected for any larger rate of relative risk aversion (this was veri¯ed only for rates
of risk aversion smaller than 70). Therefore, ¯gure 1D indicates that even though there is
only one parameter combination that solves the system of two equations in two unknowns
(see ¯gure 1C), there are many parameter combinations for which the hypothesis that either
Euler equation is zero cannot be rejected (tested separately). However, these parameter
combinations always involve a rate of relative risk aversion which is considered implausibly
high. The equity premium puzzle is very robust in representative agent models because, even
10As explained above, the statistical tests are based on the GMM framework. The orthogonality condition
E u1t can be interpreted as 1 equation in two unknowns, ¯ and 1 ¡ °, and is therefore underidenti¯ed.
However, conditional on given values of ¯ and 1 ¡ °; we have 1 overidentifying condition, which can be used
to construct a Â21 statistic. To construct this statistic, it is assumed that the Euler equation errors for a
household are uncorrelated over time. The correlation between di®erent households at the same point in
time is determined by the size of the aggregate shock hitting the economy at that time, and therefore it is
allowed to be nonzero.
11Strictly speaking, one should construct a joint test for the hypothesis that both Euler equation errors
are nonzero. I present univariate tests because they facilitate the graphical presentation of the results.
12This of course also illustrates the conventional problem that test statistics that are statistically not
distinguishable from zero may result from a lack of su±cient data and therefore from a lack of power of the
test.
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though we can ¯nd a wide range of parameter values for which the Euler equation errors are
statistically indistinguishable from zero (not just the one parameter combination indicated
by GMM), all these parameter combinations are judged implausible.
4.4 Analysis of Cohort Data
Figures 4 through 7 present an analysis of the Euler equation errors for cohort data. Figures
4 and 5 present results for cohorts formed on the basis of age and education. Figures 6 and 7
present results for cohorts formed on the basis of age. Figures 4 and 6 use cohort consumption
growth that is obtained by ¯rst obtaning the consumption levels of a representative cohort,
and subsequently computing the cohort's consumption growth. Figures 5 and 7 obtain
cohort consumption growth by averaging over individual consumption growth. Each ¯gure
contains four panels, corresponding to samples 2, 3, 4 and 1. To further motivate the analysis
of the cohort data, it is instructive to compare the descriptive statistics for the cohort data
in tables III and IV with the descriptive statistics for the individual data in table II. It
is clear that there are important di®erences in the properties of the consumption growth
data. Regardless of the method used to construct cohort consumption growth, the cohort
consumption growth data contain far fewer outliers than the individual data in table II. A
few other stylized facts should be mentioned. First, average growth rates are always higher
when computed by averaging over individual growth rates as opposed to averaging over the
consumption levels. Second, because the cohort statistics in table IV are obtained using
more cohorts, the distribution of consumption growth is more spread out than in table III.
These stylized facts are also clear from comparing tables IB and IC.
Inspection of ¯gures 4 through 7 yields three important general conclusions. First,
implied rates of risk aversion are higher than for the individual data in ¯gure 2, but dra-
matically lower than for the representative agent data in ¯gure 1. Second, the implied rate
of risk aversion is lower for assetholders than for non-assetholders. In panel D, the rate
of risk aversion is implausibly large for plausible values of the rate of time preference. I
therefore conclude that the inclusion of non-assetholders likely biases estimates of the be-
havioral parameters. This ¯nding is in accordance with existing ¯ndings in Mankiw and
Zeldes (1991), Constantinides, Brav and Geczy (1991) and Vissing-Jorgensen (1999). This
conclusion di®ers from the ¯ndings in ¯gure 2, which were obtained using individual data.
In ¯gure 2, di®erent samples indicate comparable rates of risk aversion, regardless of whether
non-assetholders were included in the sample or not. It is therefore reasonable to conclude
that there is substantial measurement error in individual consumption data, and that this
measurement error is (partially) eliminated by the representative cohort construction.13
13There is one important caveat in interpreting these ¯gures, which is the di®erences in the sizes of the
cohorts used to generate the ¯gures. Because the samples get smaller as we consider households that hold
larger asset portfolios (see tables I and II), the average cohorts used to generate panel C in ¯gures 4 through
7 are always smaller than those used to generate panel A in ¯gures 4 through 7. To investigate the impact
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Third, di®erent samples of assetholders imply di®erent rates of risk aversion. In each
of the four ¯gures, we see that panel A has the highest rates of risk aversion, with risk
aversion getting smaller as we consider households that hold larger amounts of assets.14
Again, this ¯nding is in accordance with existing research (see Mankiw and Zeldes (1991),
Constantinides, Brav and Geczy (1991) and Vissing-Jorgensen (1999)). What estimate of
risk aversion should we then remember from these ¯gures? Not all rates of time preference
investigated in these pictures are intuitively plausible: many economists would argue that ¯
should be at least 0.85 or even 0.9. For those calues of ¯, the ¯gures indicate a rate of risk
aversion of no higher than 8 and in several cases as low as 2.
4.5 Analysis of Representative Agent Data
Figure 8 relates the analysis of this paper to Mankiw and Zeldes (1991). Mankiw and Zeldes
(1991) were the ¯rst to emphasize the importance of asset market participation for the equity
premium puzzle and for estimates of the rate of risk aversion. They also use PSID data
but instead of using individual data or cohort data, they create a representative consumer
for di®erent samples of consumers based on assetholdings. The representative consumer in
their study is formed by ¯rst computing the average consumption level, and subsequently
computing consumption growth. They ¯nd that the implied rate of risk aversion is smaller
when considering assetholders and decreases when considering consumers that hold larger
amounts of assets. While the analysis used in Figure 8 is slightly di®erent from Mankiw
and Zeldes' approach15, the empirical results are quite similar.16 When considering samples
of assetholders, the implied rate of risk aversion is smaller compared to samples that contain
assetholders as well as non-assetholders. This is especially the case for ¯gure 8C as compared
of this data issue on the results, the analysis was repeated for the larger samples by repeatedly drawing
subsamples with a number of observations equal to that of the smaller samples. By using these subsamples
to generate similar ¯gures, I investigated how much of the di®erence in results between di®erent panels is
due to di®erences in cohort size. On average, 10 to 15 % of the di®erences in risk aversion found are due to
these sample size e®ects, while the remaining 85 to 90% is due to genuine di®erences in the characteristics
of the di®erent types of assetholders.
14The empirical results in panels A, B and C for ¯gures 4 through 7 indicate that cohort construction
in°uences estimates of the rate of risk aversion. This is not surprising given the di®erences in the descriptive
statistics evidenced in tables III and IV. First, when averaging over consumption growth (in ¯gures 5 and
7), we obtain larger estimates of risk aversion compared to when averaging over the consumption level (in
¯gures 4 and 6). Also, risk aversion is a bit higher when using cohorts based on age and education (in
¯gures 4 and 5) compared to the cohorts based on age in ¯gures 6 and 7. Altogether, the ¯ndings in panels
A, B and C are surprisingly robust to cohort construction.
15Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) use a local normality argument based on the continuous time model. As a
result, the only determinant of the equity premium is the covariance between consumption growth and the
risky return. In this study all moments of the distribution are taken into consideration.
16See table V for descriptive statistics on the representative agent data.
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to ¯gure 8D, and to a lesser extent for ¯gure 8B as compared to ¯gure 8D. Note also that
the use of panel data in itself does not lead to lower estimates of the rate of risk aversion.
The estimates of risk aversion in ¯gure 8D are in some cases higher than in Figure 1. This
¯nding is also similar to the one in Mankiw and Zeldes (1991).
4.6 Conditional Information
Figures 9, 10 and 11 discuss the role of conditional information. Whereas this is not the main
focus of this paper, the graphical analysis conducted here provides some interesting perspec-
tives on this issue. In the representative agent literature, the analysis of the unconditional
Euler equation points towards large risk aversion but econometric analysis of the conditional
Euler equation indicates small risk aversion (see Hansen and Singleton (1982)).17 However,
for the individual household data the evidence seems much more robust, because the uncon-
ditional Euler equation analyzed here points towards intuitively plausible parameter values
that are very similar to those obtained in Jacobs (1999).
To resolve this issue, ¯gures 9, 10 and 11 further investigate the importance of conditional
information for asset pricing in a perhaps unconventional fashion. These ¯gures investigate
orthogonality conditions two at a time, where each pair is formed by using the Euler equation
for the riskless and risky asset and one single instrument. This allows us in principle to
determine both parameters of interest. So we proceed in exactly the same fashion as with
the unconditional information. Figure 9 presents these results for the individual data, ¯gure
10 for the cohort data and ¯gure 11 for the representative agent data used by Mehra and
Prescott (1985). Figures 9 and 10 both use same sample 3 (asset holdings > $1000) and
the same instruments: lagged rates of return in panels A and B, and lagged unemployment
rates in panel C. The unemployment rates are better instruments than lagged consumption
because they perform better in the presence of measurement error. Panel D uses the lagged
unemployment rates interacted with the age of the household head. For the representative
agent data in ¯gure 11, ¯gure 11A uses the lagged risky return as an instrument, ¯gure 11B
the lagged riskless return, ¯gure 11C lagged consumption growth and ¯gure 11D consumption
growth lagged twice. Inspection of these ¯gures makes it quite clear that the impact of
conditional information is minimal. The corresponding orthogonality conditions are solved
for parameter combinations that are very similar to the case of unconditional information.
17The relationship between the estimates of the rate of risk aversion and the type of information used in
the test was pointed out by Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Grossman, Melino and Shiller (1987). The issue
is addressed in more detail in Singleton (1990), Ferson and Harvey (1992,1993), Ferson and Constantinides
(1991) and Cochrane (2001).
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4.7 Identi¯cation Problems
Finally, ¯gure 12 presents more evidence that is useful to reconcile the results in this paper
with existing results in the literature. Speci¯cally, the results in ¯gures 2 and 9 indicate that
individual household data always imply fairly low values of the rate of relative risk aversion.
When inspecting ¯gures 1 and 11, it seems that representative agent data always lead to
high estimates of the rate of risk aversion. However, several studies in the representative
agent literature starting with Hansen and Singleton (1982) have obtained low estimates of
the rate of risk aversion when using conditional information.
This ¯nding is due to an identi¯cation problem that is illustrated in ¯gure 12. Figure
12A is a more complete representation of the information in ¯gure 1C. It indicates that for
many plausible values of ¯ (for instance ¯ =0.85), the Euler equation is solved by a rate
of risk aversion in the concave region of the parameter space but also by another rate of
relative risk aversion in the nonconcave region of the parameter space. The solution in the
nonconcave region of the parameter space is not represented in ¯gure 1C. However, ¯gure
12A also illustrates that for very large values of the discount rate, we can have two solutions
to each Euler equation that are in the concave region of the parameter space, the implausibly
large one that is presented in ¯gure 1C and another value that is much smaller. Note that
these smaller risk aversion values do not exactly solve the equity premium puzzle (the curve
formed by joining the plus signs stays above the curve formed by joining the stars). However,
those solutions ensure that the representative agent literature does not have an \equity return
puzzle", which would exist using exclusively the evidence in ¯gure 1C. In ¯gure 12A, we can
¯nd discount rates smaller than 1 and low rates of risk aversion that explain the return on
the risky asset by itself.
Moreover, ¯gure 12A also indicates that if we do not take into account the equity premium
puzzle, the risk free rate puzzle does not exist. There are some combinations of discount
rates less than one and low risk aversion that explain the riskfree rate. This is also noted
for instance by Kocherlakota (1996), in his discussion of table 2 in that paper. However,
the number of parameter combinations that solves the riskfree rate puzzle is much smaller
than those that explain the rate of return on equity. What is perhaps not well articulated in
the representative agent literature is that these parameter values that solve individual Euler
equations are in a loose sense \closer" in the parameter space to parameter combinations in
the nonconcave region of the parameter space (squares and triangles) than to those parameter
values that are more commonly associated with asset pricing puzzles (plus signs and stars).
Figure 12B illustrates that when incorporating conditional information, the evidence
looks very similar to ¯gure 12A. For many plausible values of the rate of time preference,
there are two rates of risk aversion in the concave region that solve the Euler equation. This
is not the case when considering individual household data (or cohort data). As in the
representative agent case, there is a range of discount rates for which there are two rates of
risk aversion that solve the Euler equation. However, using household data it is always the
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case that one rate of risk aversion is in the concave region of the parameter space and the
other is not. Therefore, since the nonconcave region of the parameter space is thought of
as entirely implausible, the nonconcave solution is of no interest for econometric inference.18
For the representative agent case, it is possible that certain combinations of instruments
indicate a large rate of risk aversion and other combinations of instruments indicate a small
rate of risk aversion, as is the case in Hansen and Singleton (1982).19
5 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that the incomplete markets setting holds great promise to resolve
a number of important issues in asset pricing, such as the equity premium puzzle and the
riskfree rate puzzle. Even though no parameter combination can be found for which the
Euler equation error for the riskless asset and the Euler equation error for the risky asset are
both exactly zero, there exist a number of intuitively plausible combinations of the discount
rate and the rate of relative risk aversion for which Euler equation errors are not statisti-
cally di®erent from zero. In the representative agent literature, we can also ¯nd parameter
combinations that yield Euler equation errors that are statistically indistinguishable from
zero. However, these parameter combinations all imply high rates of relative risk aversion,
and are therefore judged implausible.
One of the potential problems with tests of incomplete markets is the presence of substan-
tial measurement error. This study investigates if the ¯ndings on the rate of risk aversion
are robust to the measurement error problem by repeating the empirical tests for synthetic
cohorts. While the rate of risk aversion implied by the Euler equations is a®ected, indicating
that measurement error is important, the level of risk aversion is still intuitively plausible
for assetholders.
These ¯ndings complement a number of ¯ndings in the existing literature on incomplete
markets that are typically obtained using simulation techniques. The conclusion from this
literature is that the existence of uninsurable risk can bring predicted asset returns more
in line with the data, but often at the cost of employing a model economy which may
be at odds with other stylized facts. For instance, the degree of persistence in shocks to
18Some authors advocate to exclude the nonconcave region of the parameter space from consideration (see
Braun, Constantinides and Ferson (1993)).
19This discussion is meant to illustrate an identi¯cation problem which is not always elaborated upon
in the literature. It does not claim to provide intuition for the underlying economic determinants of
this identi¯cation problem. Ferson and Constantinides (1991) provide an intuitive explanation of the
con°icting evidence on risk aversion in representative agent models, by associating conditional information
with intertemporal substitution and the high rate of risk aversion based on unconditional information with
the agent's attitude towards risk.
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individual income needed in these models may be at odds with the persistence inferred from
the dataset used in this study, the PSID. This debate is far from closed and it is likely
that additional modi¯cations to the model economy will be found that bring the model's
predictions even more in line with the data. However, the strength of the evidence contained
in this paper is that few assumptions have to be made in order to analyze the Euler equations
for individuals. The ¯nding that the Euler equation errors are statistically indistinguishable
from zero is therefore a robust indication that the presence of uninsurable idiosyncratic
risk will be an important component of any future resolution of asset pricing puzzles. These
¯ndings indicate that we have to come up with models that do not allow agents to self-insure,
leading to large di®erences in the marginal rate of substitution ratios across consumers. It
must also be noted that the ¯ndings in this paper are very useful for the simulation-based
literature (and for several other areas in economics and ¯nance) in a di®erent respect, because
we obtain inference on behavioral parameters that can be used as inputs in those studies.
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics for Household and Cohort
Consumption Growth
This table presents mean consumption growth for individual households and cohorts as
well as the minimum and maximum consumption growth for individual households and co-
horts. Panel A contains data on individual consumption growth. Panel B contains data
on cohort consumption growth, with cohorts sorted by age and education. Panel C con-
tains data on cohort consumption growth, with cohorts sorted by age. In Panel A, average
consumption growth is indicated by cgav, minimum consumption growth by cgmin and max-
imum consumption growth by cgmax: In panels B and C, we have two types of consumption
growth. The ¯rst type, with average consumption growth cg1;av, minimum consumption
growth cg1;min and maximum consumption growth cg1;max is obtained by ¯rst averaging over
the level of consumption in the cohort to get average cohort consumption, and subsequently
computing consumption growth: The second type of consumption growth, with average con-
sumption growth cg2;av, minimum consumption growth cg2;min and maximum consumption
growth cg2;max is obtained by averaging over individual household's consumption growth in
the cohort: Every table also indicates the number of observations #obs, average current and
lagged family size fst and fst¡1; and the average percentage lagged occupational unemploy-
ment rate occt¡1. Panel A also contains the averages of the current and lagged (gross) real
return on the risky asset Rri;t and Rri;t¡1 and the current and lagged (gross) real return on
the riskless asset Rrl;t and Rrl;t¡1:
Panel A: Data on Individual Households
sample #obs cgav cgmin cgmax fst fst¡1 occt¡1 Rri;t Rri;t¡1 Rrl;t Rrl;t¡1
>0 5029 1.061 0.224 4.387 3.180 3.154 5.026 1.083 1.019 1.016 1.010
>1000 2990 1.060 0.224 4.177 3.143 3.136 4.478 1.079 1.034 1.015 1.008
>10000 769 1.048 0.238 3.513 3.002 3.029 4.076 1.071 1.022 1.011 1.004
all 18813 1.069 0.116 9.741 3.285 3.241 6.510 1.081 1.037 1.016 1.009
Panel B: Data on cohorts sorted using age and education
sample #obs cg1;av cg1;min cg1;max cg2;av cg2;min cg2;max fst fst¡1 occt¡1
>0 288 1.005 0.653 1.348 1.046 0.653 1.344 3.281 3.297 5.225
>1000 287 1.013 0.577 1.542 1.052 0.584 1.693 3.206 3.218 4.985
>10000 249 1.046 0.321 3.513 1.064 0.394 3.513 3.117 3.158 4.537
all 288 1.000 0.778 1.191 1.048 0.855 1.259 3.399 3.417 5.970
Panel C: Data on cohorts sorted using age
sample #obs cg1;av cg1;min cg1;max cg2;av cg2;min cg2;max fst fst¡1 occt¡1
>0 432 1.010 0.544 1.408 1.050 0.648 1.605 3.260 3.274 4.931
>1000 432 1.020 0.443 2.770 1.057 0.443 2.770 3.174 3.182 4.503
>10000 336 1.040 0.321 3.513 1.056 0.489 3.513 3.056 3.080 4.020
all 432 0.999 0.726 1.279 1.047 0.803 1.418 3.429 3.450 6.394
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Table II: Descriptive Statistics for Household Consumption
Growth (year by year)
This table presents mean consumption growth for individual households as well as the
minimum and maximum consumption growth for individual households (all on a year-by-year
basis). Average consumption growth is indicated by cgav, minimum consumption growth by
cgmin and maximum consumption growth by cgmax: The table further indicates the number
of observations in a given year #obs, average current and lagged family size fst and fst¡1;
the average percentage lagged occupational unemployment rate occt¡1, as well as the current
and lagged (gross) real return on the risky asset Rri;t and Rri;t¡1 and the current and lagged
(gross) real return on the riskless asset Rrl;t and Rrl;t¡1:
Panel A: Asset Holdings > 0
year #obs cgav cgmin cgmax fst fst¡1 occt¡1 Rri;t Rri;t¡1 Rrl;t Rrl;t¡1
1974 368 1.026 0.332 3.379 3.315 3.331 3.651 1.018 0.723 0.981 0.969
1975 381 1.109 0.315 3.357 3.314 3.251 5.926 1.166 1.018 0.998 0.981
1976 423 1.078 0.342 4.387 3.241 3.245 5.474 0.946 1.166 0.985 0.998
1977 419 1.059 0.224 4.177 3.238 3.210 4.636 0.957 0.946 0.985 0.985
1978 421 1.026 0.354 4.141 3.216 3.180 3.928 1.017 0.957 0.975 0.985
1979 421 1.064 0.323 3.682 3.140 3.118 3.655 1.066 1.017 0.976 0.975
1980 408 1.037 0.347 2.853 3.127 3.085 4.753 1.037 1.066 1.021 0.976
1981 427 1.052 0.276 3.185 3.114 3.084 5.371 0.936 1.037 1.065 1.021
1982 442 1.089 0.301 2.928 3.101 3.070 6.756 1.363 0.936 1.058 1.065
1983 435 1.078 0.350 3.753 3.119 3.094 6.535 1.006 1.363 1.046 1.058
1984 434 1.047 0.352 3.191 3.149 3.108 4.868 1.172 1.006 1.050 1.046
1985 450 1.065 0.238 3.513 3.126 3.113 4.553 1.285 1.172 1.049 1.050
Panel B: Asset Holdings > 1000
year #obs cgav cgmin cgmax fst fst¡1 occt¡1 Rri;t Rri;t¡1 Rrl;t Rrl;t¡1
1974 237 1.030 0.363 3.379 3.299 3.295 3.280 1.018 0.723 0.981 0.969
1975 246 1.113 0.387 2.424 3.321 3.260 5.168 1.166 1.018 0.998 0.981
1976 263 1.070 0.342 3.232 3.235 3.250 4.847 0.946 1.166 0.985 0.998
1977 259 1.061 0.224 4.177 3.239 3.220 4.226 0.957 0.946 0.985 0.985
1978 256 1.035 0.354 4.141 3.183 3.167 3.529 1.017 0.957 0.975 0.985
1979 257 1.066 0.476 3.682 3.132 3.136 3.319 1.066 1.017 0.976 0.975
1980 249 1.036 0.401 2.853 3.080 3.048 4.189 1.037 1.066 1.021 0.976
1981 248 1.035 0.380 2.471 3.060 3.084 4.682 0.936 1.037 1.065 1.021
1982 247 1.081 0.301 2.928 3.016 3.016 6.008 1.363 0.936 1.058 1.065
1983 242 1.069 0.394 3.753 3.074 3.041 5.810 1.006 1.363 1.046 1.058
1984 236 1.065 0.378 3.191 3.067 3.097 4.484 1.172 1.006 1.050 1.046
1985 250 1.064 0.238 3.513 3.008 3.012 4.245 1.285 1.172 1.049 1.050
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Table II (continued)
Panel C: Asset Holdings > 10000
year #obs cgav cgmin cgmax fst fst¡1 occt¡1 Rri;t Rri;t¡1 Rrl;t Rrl;t¡1
1974 79 1.019 0.368 2.088 3.177 3.215 2.970 1.018 0.723 0.981 0.969
1975 81 1.084 0.580 2.424 3.222 3.172 4.820 1.166 1.018 0.998 0.981
1976 77 1.068 0.342 2.593 3.168 3.246 4.545 0.946 1.166 0.985 0.998
1977 71 0.960 0.415 1.836 3.197 3.239 4.044 0.957 0.946 0.985 0.985
1978 65 1.096 0.595 2.556 2.907 3.046 3.190 1.017 0.957 0.975 0.985
1979 63 1.053 0.516 2.367 2.920 2.873 2.924 1.066 1.017 0.976 0.975
1980 63 1.015 0.506 2.208 2.984 2.936 3.773 1.037 1.066 1.021 0.976
1981 61 1.029 0.432 2.471 2.868 2.934 4.303 0.936 1.037 1.065 1.021
1982 59 1.013 0.652 1.838 2.915 2.898 5.311 1.363 0.936 1.058 1.065
1983 54 1.045 0.394 2.250 2.833 2.907 5.118 1.006 1.363 1.046 1.058
1984 49 1.157 0.669 3.191 2.857 2.877 3.974 1.172 1.006 1.050 1.046
1985 47 1.061 0.238 3.513 2.659 2.702 4.168 1.285 1.172 1.049 1.050
Panel D: All Households
year #obs cgav cgmin cgmax fst fst¡1 occt¡1 Rri;t Rri;t¡1 Rrl;t Rrl;t¡1
1974 1385 1.042 0.282 4.373 3.627 3.606 4.752 1.018 0.723 0.981 0.969
1975 1434 1.099 0.308 5.945 3.543 3.500 7.637 1.166 1.018 0.998 0.981
1976 1552 1.084 0.301 5.561 3.440 3.416 6.679 0.946 1.166 0.985 0.998
1977 1627 1.087 0.209 5.230 3.386 3.342 5.864 0.957 0.946 0.985 0.985
1978 1599 1.036 0.218 4.883 3.312 3.280 4.950 1.017 0.957 0.975 0.985
1979 1643 1.064 0.314 9.741 3.265 3.193 4.820 1.066 1.017 0.976 0.975
1980 1556 1.037 0.231 5.207 3.185 3.151 6.419 1.037 1.066 1.021 0.976
1981 1553 1.054 0.276 5.127 3.175 3.121 6.882 0.936 1.037 1.065 1.021
1982 1569 1.107 0.258 4.072 3.163 3.107 8.976 1.363 0.936 1.058 1.065
1983 1599 1.082 0.169 6.916 3.149 3.093 8.673 1.006 1.363 1.046 1.058
1984 1631 1.065 0.116 7.643 3.152 3.094 6.372 1.172 1.006 1.050 1.046
1985 1665 1.075 0.238 5.018 3.104 3.066 6.113 1.285 1.172 1.049 1.050
31
Table III: Descriptive Statistics for Cohort Consumption Growth
(year by year, cohorts formed using age and education)
This table presents mean consumption growth for cohorts as well as the minimum and
maximum consumption growth for cohorts (all on a year-by-year basis). The cohorts are
sorted using age and education. The table reports on two types of cohort consumption. The
¯rst type, with average consumption growth cg1;av, minimum consumption growth cg1;min
and maximum consumption growth cg1;max is obtained by averaging over the level of con-
sumption in the cohort: The second type, with average consumption growth cg2;av, minimum
consumption growth cg2;min and maximum consumption growth cg2;max is obtained by av-
eraging over consumption growth in the cohort: The table further indicates the number of
observations in a given year #obs, average current and lagged family size fst and fst¡1and
the average percentage lagged occupational unemployment rate occt¡1:
Panel A: Asset Holdings > 0
year #obs cg1;av cg1;min cg1;max cg2;av cg2;min cg2;max fst fst¡1 occt¡1
1974 24 0.986 0.768 1.165 1.019 0.795 1.217 3.491 3.554 3.580
1975 24 1.065 0.851 1.348 1.098 0.870 1.344 3.483 3.459 6.131
1976 24 1.030 0.778 1.139 1.058 0.771 1.242 3.424 3.460 5.510
1977 24 0.989 0.762 1.152 1.037 0.821 1.193 3.436 3.466 4.707
1978 24 0.989 0.790 1.290 1.035 0.865 1.300 3.348 3.356 3.904
1979 24 1.000 0.734 1.187 1.040 0.824 1.185 3.277 3.303 3.690
1980 24 0.981 0.800 1.238 1.027 0.841 1.294 3.263 3.274 4.944
1981 24 0.991 0.852 1.185 1.031 0.865 1.224 3.197 3.221 5.584
1982 24 1.023 0.691 1.196 1.072 0.764 1.262 3.149 3.149 7.163
1983 24 1.011 0.662 1.268 1.054 0.653 1.341 3.136 3.184 7.261
1984 24 0.994 0.759 1.184 1.029 0.809 1.225 3.089 3.067 5.237
1985 24 0.999 0.653 1.195 1.050 0.722 1.334 3.077 3.070 4.985
Panel B: Asset Holdings > 1000
year #obs cg1;av cg1;min cg1;max cg2;av cg2;min cg2;max fst fst¡1 occt¡1
1974 24 0.990 0.758 1.140 1.030 0.785 1.498 3.389 3.412 3.330
1975 24 1.076 0.898 1.341 1.107 0.918 1.330 3.370 3.344 5.666
1976 24 1.027 0.807 1.268 1.059 0.806 1.459 3.362 3.377 5.148
1977 24 1.017 0.707 1.304 1.062 0.754 1.338 3.353 3.390 4.500
1978 24 0.983 0.775 1.337 1.036 0.872 1.358 3.254 3.252 3.736
1979 24 1.005 0.577 1.262 1.038 0.584 1.387 3.212 3.241 3.618
1980 24 0.994 0.803 1.542 1.036 0.848 1.546 3.127 3.170 4.685
1981 24 0.994 0.756 1.229 1.022 0.765 1.297 3.105 3.141 5.421
1982 24 1.007 0.655 1.268 1.060 0.728 1.454 3.016 3.002 6.913
1983 24 1.027 0.687 1.453 1.053 0.692 1.693 3.089 3.095 6.596
1984 24 1.014 0.729 1.234 1.051 0.729 1.294 3.128 3.129 5.203
1985 24 1.028 0.671 1.504 1.073 0.761 1.662 3.060 3.052 5.066
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Table III (continued)
Panel C: Asset Holdings > 10000
year #obs cg1;av cg1;min cg1;max cg2;av cg2;min cg2;max fst fst¡1 occt¡1
1974 23 0.994 0.655 1.212 0.999 0.655 1.224 3.480 3.562 2.947
1975 24 1.098 0.727 2.273 1.117 0.733 2.273 3.399 3.467 5.477
1976 24 1.039 0.748 1.532 1.065 0.793 1.523 3.376 3.401 5.424
1977 24 0.933 0.555 1.525 0.956 0.555 1.525 3.340 3.459 4.446
1978 22 1.051 0.595 1.436 1.067 0.595 1.510 2.972 3.075 3.536
1979 20 1.127 0.703 2.367 1.143 0.778 2.367 3.053 3.043 3.150
1980 23 1.018 0.588 1.751 1.031 0.588 1.751 3.125 3.104 4.325
1981 20 1.015 0.578 2.471 1.035 0.688 2.471 2.990 3.009 5.203
1982 18 1.032 0.772 1.838 1.042 0.772 1.838 2.932 2.906 5.799
1983 16 1.021 0.394 1.296 1.034 0.394 1.453 2.880 2.990 5.514
1984 16 1.169 0.735 2.461 1.173 0.726 2.461 2.856 2.835 4.324
1985 19 1.104 0.321 3.513 1.149 0.526 3.513 2.663 2.678 4.605
Panel D: All Households
year #obs cg1;av cg1;min cg1;max cg2;av cg2;min cg2;max fst fst¡1 occt¡1
1974 24 0.980 0.834 1.092 1.017 0.855 1.154 3.732 3.768 4.250
1975 24 1.037 0.854 1.172 1.089 0.902 1.259 3.694 3.698 6.849
1976 24 1.021 0.895 1.089 1.064 0.959 1.167 3.630 3.666 6.092
1977 24 1.005 0.821 1.085 1.055 0.869 1.190 3.565 3.574 5.373
1978 24 0.971 0.872 1.191 1.014 0.912 1.219 3.456 3.506 4.454
1979 24 0.992 0.862 1.091 1.039 0.900 1.136 3.427 3.438 4.401
1980 24 0.967 0.778 1.118 1.021 0.881 1.167 3.321 3.344 5.806
1981 24 0.992 0.839 1.082 1.034 0.873 1.114 3.273 3.284 6.277
1982 24 1.020 0.904 1.110 1.077 0.937 1.190 3.223 3.226 8.223
1983 24 1.022 0.956 1.144 1.071 0.983 1.178 3.196 3.224 8.061
1984 24 1.002 0.832 1.108 1.053 0.875 1.185 3.157 3.154 6.012
1985 24 0.991 0.781 1.087 1.047 0.883 1.141 3.116 3.119 5.837
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Table IV: Descriptive Statistics for Cohort Consumption Growth
(year by year, cohorts formed using age)
This table presents mean consumption growth for cohorts as well as the minimum and
maximum consumption growth for cohorts (all on a year-by-year basis). The cohorts are
sorted using age. The table reports on two types of cohort consumption. The ¯rst type, with
average consumption growth cg1;av, minimum consumption growth cg1;min and maximum
consumption growth cg1;max is obtained by averaging over the level of consumption in the
cohort: The second type, with average consumption growth cg2;av, minimum consumption
growth cg2;min and maximum consumption growth cg2;max is obtained by averaging over
consumption growth in the cohort: The table further indicates the number of observations
in a given year #obs, average current and lagged family size fst and fst¡1and the average
percentage lagged occupational unemployment rate occt¡1:
Panel A: Asset Holdings > 0
year #obs cg1;av cg1;min cg1;max cg2;av cg2;min cg2;max fst fst¡1 occt¡1
1974 36 0.996 0.762 1.408 1.024 0.800 1.418 3.441 3.494 3.575
1975 36 1.052 0.731 1.333 1.090 0.842 1.605 3.490 3.464 5.895
1976 36 1.039 0.830 1.377 1.065 0.842 1.284 3.409 3.468 5.361
1977 36 0.997 0.544 1.228 1.046 0.648 1.299 3.445 3.458 4.522
1978 36 0.982 0.684 1.265 1.029 0.776 1.293 3.313 3.318 3.735
1979 36 1.012 0.749 1.289 1.047 0.819 1.328 3.253 3.269 3.558
1980 36 0.979 0.703 1.344 1.029 0.739 1.423 3.198 3.198 4.613
1981 36 0.994 0.742 1.229 1.033 0.830 1.328 3.195 3.224 5.254
1982 36 1.031 0.721 1.349 1.077 0.788 1.498 3.129 3.139 6.643
1983 36 1.036 0.913 1.279 1.076 0.874 1.415 3.085 3.122 6.543
1984 36 1.002 0.761 1.159 1.040 0.810 1.303 3.087 3.054 4.939
1985 36 1.000 0.757 1.255 1.050 0.822 1.379 3.083 3.078 4.533
Panel B: Asset Holdings > 1000
year #obs cg1;av cg1;min cg1;max cg2;av cg2;min cg2;max fst fst¡1 occt¡1
1974 36 0.995 0.760 1.388 1.021 0.811 1.424 3.315 3.344 3.274
1975 36 1.058 0.443 1.548 1.090 0.443 1.852 3.377 3.338 5.400
1976 36 1.037 0.793 1.230 1.069 0.793 1.398 3.301 3.342 4.876
1977 36 1.018 0.652 1.371 1.062 0.790 1.348 3.411 3.412 4.189
1978 36 0.986 0.653 1.408 1.037 0.714 1.450 3.194 3.180 3.392
1979 36 1.023 0.725 1.665 1.050 0.783 1.846 3.131 3.116 3.294
1980 36 0.993 0.703 1.493 1.036 0.739 1.516 3.080 3.083 4.132
1981 36 0.990 0.615 1.219 1.021 0.658 1.378 3.105 3.153 4.806
1982 36 1.024 0.607 1.697 1.073 0.643 1.842 3.054 3.083 6.184
1983 36 1.059 0.883 1.301 1.089 0.854 1.440 3.075 3.077 5.818
1984 36 1.077 0.718 2.770 1.109 0.759 2.770 3.050 3.071 4.420
1985 36 0.985 0.678 1.310 1.027 0.662 1.541 2.992 2.988 4.248
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Table IV (continued)
Panel C: Asset Holdings > 10000
year #obs cg1;av cg1;min cg1;max cg2;av cg2;min cg2;max fst fst¡1 occt¡1
1974 30 1.001 0.584 1.368 1.006 0.584 1.358 3.470 3.501 2.837
1975 31 1.036 0.643 2.334 1.058 0.643 2.348 3.389 3.365 4.716
1976 32 1.097 0.748 1.882 1.115 0.793 1.882 3.187 3.252 4.325
1977 31 0.913 0.489 1.212 0.940 0.489 1.212 3.208 3.318 4.072
1978 28 1.094 0.737 1.874 1.106 0.737 1.874 2.913 3.020 3.317
1979 29 1.036 0.521 2.367 1.047 0.521 2.367 2.985 2.978 2.952
1980 28 1.006 0.588 1.751 1.015 0.588 1.751 3.110 3.038 3.608
1981 26 1.027 0.578 2.471 1.046 0.688 2.471 2.872 2.960 4.264
1982 25 1.018 0.732 1.592 1.029 0.737 1.592 2.920 2.926 5.197
1983 25 1.040 0.813 1.264 1.057 0.820 1.403 2.840 2.900 5.055
1984 26 1.148 0.669 2.679 1.152 0.669 2.282 2.851 2.801 3.949
1985 25 1.082 0.321 3.513 1.122 0.526 3.513 2.730 2.690 4.211
Panel D: All Households
year #obs cg1;av cg1;min cg1;max cg2;av cg2;min cg2;max fst fst¡1 occt¡1
1974 36 0.986 0.842 1.117 1.020 0.888 1.163 3.825 3.865 4.652
1975 36 1.033 0.871 1.279 1.084 0.939 1.418 3.754 3.775 7.533
1976 36 1.013 0.877 1.095 1.058 0.952 1.184 3.661 3.708 6.601
1977 36 1.011 0.880 1.148 1.063 0.940 1.230 3.589 3.606 5.763
1978 36 0.963 0.800 1.098 1.005 0.861 1.142 3.482 3.538 4.770
1979 36 0.992 0.838 1.175 1.038 0.874 1.291 3.420 3.431 4.690
1980 36 0.968 0.808 1.223 1.019 0.861 1.226 3.323 3.356 6.283
1981 36 0.992 0.853 1.182 1.035 0.897 1.207 3.295 3.312 6.696
1982 36 1.021 0.904 1.142 1.080 0.936 1.256 3.259 3.255 8.769
1983 36 1.019 0.890 1.139 1.068 0.912 1.194 3.219 3.241 8.567
1984 36 0.995 0.726 1.100 1.045 0.803 1.219 3.178 3.182 6..357
1985 36 0.996 0.782 1.108 1.051 0.917 1.157 3.136 3.135 6.041
35
Table V: Descriptive Statistics for Representative Agent
Consumption Growth
This table presents mean consumption growth as well as the minimum and maximum
consumption growth for the representative agent constructed using the individual consump-
tion data. Average consumption growth is indicated by cgav, minimum consumption growth
by cgmin and maximum consumption growth by cgmax: Consumption growth for the rep-
resentative agent is obtained by ¯rst averaging over the household consumption level in a
given year to get average consumption, and subsequently computing consumption growth
using the average consumption levels in two consecutive years: Every table also indicates the
number of observations #obs (12 years available in all cases), average current and lagged
family size fst and fst¡1; and the average percentage lagged occupational unemployment rate
occt¡1.
sample #obs cgav cgmin cgmax fst fst¡1 occt¡1
>0 12 1.010 0.966 1.059 3.229 3.208 4.951
>1000 12 1.011 0.960 1.069 3.170 3.166 4.452
>10000 12 1.007 0.905 1.103 2.982 3.011 4.078
all 12 1.007 0.971 1.032 3.359 3.326 6.430
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Figure 2: Euler equation error analysis for individual PSID data 
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Figure 3: Euler equation error analysis for individual PSID data.  The area between the solid (broken) lines indicates
insignificant test statistics for the null hypothesis that the Euler error for the riskless (risky) asset is zero.    
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Figure 4: Euler equation error analysis for cohort PSID data.  Cohorts are formed using age and education. Consumption growth is obtained by averaging 
over individual consumption. Squares and triangles indicate discount rate-risk aversion combinations that equate the Euler equation to zero in sample. 
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Figure 5: Euler equation error analysis for cohort PSID data.  Cohorts are formed using age and education.  Consumption growth is obtained by averaging        
over individual consumption growth.  Squares and triangles indicate discount rate-risk aversion combinations that equate the Euler equation to zero in sample. 
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Figure 6: Euler equation error analysis for cohort PSID data.  Cohorts are formed using age.  Consumption growth is obtained by averaging over individual
consumption.  Squares and triangles indicate discount rate-risk aversion combinations that equate the Euler equation to zero in sample.                  
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Figure 7: Euler equation error analysis for cohort PSID data.  Cohorts are formed using age.  Consumption growth is obtained by averaging over individual
consumption growth.  Squares and triangles indicate discount rate-risk aversion combinations that equate the Euler equation to zero in sample.           
0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1
-50
-45
-40
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
discount rate
-
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
r
i
s
k
 
a
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
Panel A: Nonzero Holdings of Riskless and Risky Asset
riskless asset
risky asset   
0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1
-50
-45
-40
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
discount rate
-
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
r
i
s
k
 
a
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
Panel B: Holdings of Riskless and Risky Asset > $1000
riskless asset
risky asset   
0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1
-50
-45
-40
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
discount rate
-
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
r
i
s
k
 
a
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
Panel C: Holdings of Riskless and Risky Asset > $10000
riskless asset
risky asset   
0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1
-50
-45
-40
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
discount rate
-
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
r
i
s
k
 
a
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
Panel D: All Households
riskless asset
risky asset   
Figure 8: Euler equation error analysis for PSID "representative agent" data. The representative agent is obtained by averaging over consumption.
Squares and triangles indicate discount rate-risk aversion combinations that equate the Euler equation to zero in sample.                        
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Panel A: Lagged risky return as instrument 
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Panel D: Lagged occupational unemployment x age as instrument
riskless asset
risky asset   
Figure 9: Euler equation error analysis for individual PSID data, exploiting the orthogonality between the Euler equation error and a lagged instrument                     
(conditional information). All panels are for the dataset containing only households with holdings of the riskless and risky asset > $1000.                                 
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Figure 10: Euler equation error analysis for cohort PSID data, exploiting the orthogonality between the Euler equation error and a lagged instrument                    
(conditional information). Cohorts are formed using age and education and consumption growth is obtained by averaging over individual consumption.                      
All panels are for the dataset containing only households with holdings of the riskless and risky asset > $1000.                                                        
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Figure 11: Euler equation error analysis for representative agent data, exploiting the orthogonality between the Euler equaton error 
and a lagged instrument (conditional information). All panels are for the Mehra-Prescott data (yearly data 1889-1979)                 
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Figure 12: Euler equation error analysis for representative agent data.
Both panels are for the Mehra-Prescott data (yearly data 1889-1979).   
Liste des publications au CIRANO*
Série Scientifique / Scientific Series (ISSN 1198-8177)
2002s-08 The Rate of Risk Aversion May Be Lower Than You Think / Kris Jacobs
2002s-07 A Structural Analysis of the Correlated Random Coefficient Wage Regression Model
/ Christian Belzil et Jörgen Hansen
2002s-06 Information Asymmetry, Insurance, and the Decision to Hospitalize / Åke Blomqvist
et Pierre Thomas Léger
2002s-05 Coping with Stressful Decisions: Individual Differences, Appraisals and Choice /
Ann-Renée Blais
2002s-04 A New Proof Of The Maximum Principle / Ngo Van Long et Koji Shimomura
2002s-03 Macro Surprises And Short-Term Behaviour In Bond Futures / Eugene Durenard et
David Veredas
2002s-02 Financial Asset Returns, Market Timing, and Volatility Dynamics / Peter F.
Christoffersen et Francis X. Diebold
2002s-01 An Empirical Analysis of Water Supply Contracts / Serge Garcia et Alban
Thomas
2001s-71 A Theoretical Comparison Between Integrated and Realized Volatilities Modeling
/ Nour Meddahi
2001s-70 An Eigenfunction Approach for Volatility Modeling / Nour Meddahi
2001s-69 Dynamic Prevention in Short Term Insurance Contracts / M. Martin Boyer et
Karine Gobert
2001s-68 Serial Cost Sharing in Multidimensional Contexts / Cyril Téjédo et Michel
Truchon
2001s-67 Learning from Strike / Fabienne Tournadre et Marie-Claire Villeval
2001s-66 Incentives in Common Agency / Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné
2001s-65 Detecting Mutiple Breaks in Financial Market Volatility Dynamics / Elena
Andreou et Eric Ghysels
2001s-64 Real Options, Preemption, and the Dynamics of Industry Investments / Marcel Boyer,
Pierre Lasserre, Thomas Mariotti et Michel Moreaux
2001s-63 Dropout, School Performance and Working while in School: An Econometric Model
with Heterogeneous Groups / Marcel Dagenais, Claude Montmarquette et Nathalie
Viennot-Briot
2001s-62 Derivatives Do Affect Mutual Funds Returns : How and When? / Charles Cao,
Eric Ghysels et Frank Hatheway
2001s-61 Conditional Quantiles of Volatility in Equity Index and Foreign Exchange Data /
John W. Galbraith, Serguei Zernov and Victoria Zinde-Walsh
2001s-60 The Public-Private Sector Risk-Sharing in the French Insurance "Cat. Nat.
System" / Nathalie de Marcellis-Warin et Erwann Michel-Kerjan
                                                
* Consultez la liste complète des publications du CIRANO et les publications elles-mêmes sur notre site Internet :
http://www.cirano.qc.ca/publication/documents.html
2001s-59 Compensation and Auditing with Correlated Information / M. Martin Boyer et
Patrick González
2001s-58 Resistance is Futile: An Essay in Crime and Commitment / M. Martin Boyer
2001s-57 The Unreliability of Output Gap Estimates in Real Time / Athanasios Orphanides
et Simon van Norden
2001s-56 Exact Nonparametric Two-Sample Homogeneity Tests for Possibly Discrete
Distributions / Jean-Marie Dufour et Abdeljelil Farhat
2001s-55 Les coûts de la réglementation : une revue de la littérature / Robert Gagné, Paul
Lanoie, Pierre-Carl Micheud et Michel Patry
2001s-54 Testing for structural Change in the Presence of Auxiliary Models / Eric Ghysels
et Alain Guay
2001s-53 Environmental Regulation and Productivity: New Findings on the Porter
Hypothesis / Paul Lanoie, Michel Patry et Richard Lajeunesse
2001s-52 The Aftermarket Performance of Initial Public Offerings in Canada / Maher Kooli
et Jean-Marc Suret
2001s-51 Capital Structure and Risk Management / Karine Gobert
2001s-50 The Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings: Futher Canadian Evidence / Maher
Kooli et Jean-Marc Suret
2001s-49 How Innovative Are Canadian Firms Compared to Some European Firms? A
Comparative Look at Innovation Surveys / Pierre Mohnen et Pierre Therrien
2001s-48 A Tale of Two Ports / Ngo Van Long et Kar-yiu Wong
2001s-47 Wage Policy of Firms: An Empirical Investigation / Stéphanie Lluis
2001s-46 Forecasting Some Low-Predictability Time Series Using Diffusion Indices / Marc
Brisson, Bryan Campbell et John W. Galbraith
2001s-45 The Importance of the Loss Function in Option Pricing / Peter Christoffersen et
Kris Jacobs
2001s-44 Let's Get "Real" about Using Economic Data / Peter Christoffersen, Eric Ghysels
et Norman R. Swanson
2001s-43 Fragmentation, Outsourcing and the Service Sector / Ngo Van Long, Ray
Riezman et Antoine Soubeyran
2001s-42 Nonlinear Features of Realized FX Volatility / John M. Maheu et Thomas H.
McCurdy
2001s-41 Job Satisfaction and Quits: Theory and Evidence from the German
Socioeconomic Panel / Louis Lévy-Garboua, Claude Montmarquette et Véronique
Simonnet
2001s-40 Logique et tests d'hypothèse : réflexions sur les problèmes mal posés en
économétrie / Jean-Marie Dufour
2001s-39 Managing IT Outsourcing Risk: Lessons Learned / Benoit A. Aubert, Suzanne
Rivard et Michel Patry
2001s-38 Organizational Design of R&D Activities / Stefan Ambec et Michel Poitevin
